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Abstract
Long Term Evolution (LTE) is the most recent standard in mobile communi-
cations, introduced by 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). Most of
the works in literature about LTE security analyze authentication procedures,
while handover procedures are far less considered. This paper focuses on the
procedures that are activated when a mobile device moves between different
LTE cells and between LTE and the older Universal Mobile Telecommunications
System (UMTS) networks and completes previous results with a deeper formal
analysis of these procedures. The analysis shows that security properties (secrecy
of keys, including backward/forward secrecy, immunity from off-line guessing
attacks, and network components authentication) hold almost as expected in
nominal conditions, i.e. when all backhaul links are secured and all backhaul
nodes are trusted. The paper also analyses how these security properties are
affected by possible anomalous situations, such as a compromised backhaul node
or a misconfiguration by which a backhaul link becomes not protected and can
be accessed by an attacker. The analysis shows that some security properties
hold even in these adverse cases while other properties are compromised.
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1. Introduction
Fourth generation (4G) mobile networks are rapidly spreading out. Long
Term Evolution (LTE), which is an evolution of the previous third generation
(3G) Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), is already available
in many countries. For a considerable period of time these two technologies will5
co-exist, because the new devices on the market, such as smartphones, at this
time support both connection technologies.
Enabling seamless user mobility is a key factor in the LTE and UMTS
standards defined by the 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project)[1]. Different
procedures have been specified in order to ensure continuity of service to users10
who move, for example, from an area which is covered by an LTE cell to an
area covered by another adjacent LTE cell. Similarly, the standards define
procedures to seamlessly move from an area where both 4G and 3G networks are
available to an area with only 3G network coverage (or vice versa). In particular,
these scenarios where different technologies are cooperating require non-trivial15
procedures. In fact, an important difference between 3G and 4G networks is
that the latter have a flat-IP architecture (all network devices communicate over
IP technology), unlike 3G, where communications between devices use radio
channels with multiple access technologies.
Formal verification is a well-known technique that can be used to perform a20
thorough analysis of a communication protocol, in order to identify the presence
of bugs in its design or to prove its correctness. In the case of cryptographic
protocols, formal verification can identify possible attacks on the protocol or
prove that no attacks are possible under certain assumptions. In the past, formal
verification has already been applied to security protocols for mobile networks.25
In particular, many works in the literature have formally analyzed the basic
procedures for authenticating users in 3G and in 4G networks, while a smaller
number of studies has been devoted to the procedures that allow user mobility in
these networks. As a consequence, not all the possible mobility scenarios already
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have a formal analysis.30
The 3GPP defines as IRAT (Inter-Radio Access Technology) handover the
procedures in which it is necessary to map the existing security context (ciphering
keys, user data) in the transition between two different technologies (such as
for example from LTE to UMTS). Instead, the procedures activated when a
connection must be seamlessly moved between two LTE network nodes are called35
Intra-Handover procedures.
Intra-Handover procedures have been formally analyzed in [3], while recently
we presented the results of a formal analysis of the IRAT handover procedures
that enable users to seamlessly switch from a 3G to a 4G connection, and vice
versa [4].40
This paper provides a thorough formal analysis of LTE-LTE and LTE-UMTS
procedures, which extends and completes the results previously provided in [3]
and in our previous conference paper [4]. In particular, our analysis of LTE-LTE
handover procedures includes the verification of aspects that were not considered
in [3], including a wider set of security properties, a more accurate model of45
the procedures, including the possible presence of emergency calls during the
handover, and the analysis of anomalous situations where some links or nodes
are compromised. Instead, for what concerns the analysis of LTE-UMTS and
UMTS-LTE handover procedures, although some of the results presented here
were already presented in [4], in this paper we extend those results by using50
more accurate models, where the possibility that emergency calls are executed
during the handover procedures is considered. Moreover, in this paper we provide
a thorough description and motivation of all the formal models used for our
analysis and the underlying design choices, which were presented only in part
and in much less detail in [4], for the previously used models.55
The tool used for formal analysis is ProVerif [5], which is an automatic formal
verifier for cryptographic protocols. In this paper we exploit many of the features
of ProVerif which were not used in previous papers about LTE-LTE handover
procedures analysis. Specifically, in addition to basic security properties such as
secrecy of all the keys used before, during and after the handovers, secrecy of60
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payloads exchanged, and authentication between network components, we also
analyse backward and forward secrecy of keys, conditional secrecy of payloads
(i.e. secrecy that must hold only when optional encryption of data is enabled) and
immunity from off-line guessing attacks. The results that have been obtained show
that in some particular scenarios the aforementioned security properties are only65
in part assured in the models that have been developed, which sheds some more
light on the security of LTE handover procedures. In particular, in this paper we
analyze particular situations that may arise because of misconfiguration errors
in the operator networks or eNodeB nodes that are compromized by attackers
(some LTE cells are especially designed in order to cover small areas and to70
be placed in relatively easily accessible places, e.g. indoor premises). In these
cases, confidentiality of user data traffic is not always provided, and the lack
of authentication between network elements makes injection of fake signaling
messages possible. This kind of result may be interesting especially for mobile
operators, who have to assess security risks in their networks.75
The remainer of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some
background about the LTE and UMTS networks and about ProVerif, and
Section 3 discusses related work. Section 4 introduces the main security properties
that have to be ensured in the LTE-related handover procedures and discusses
security threats. Then, Section 5 presents the formal modeling of procedures and80
the formal property specifications based on ProVerif, while Section 6 presents
the results of the formal analysis. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. Background
2.1. UMTS and LTE overview
This section presents the basic concepts of 3G and 4G mobile networks, which85
are essential in order to understand the work presented in this paper. For further
details, refer to the 3GPP specifications [1].
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2.1.1. UMTS overview
Figure 1a shows the architecture of a UMTS network. The different com-
ponents are grouped into three domains: the Mobile Station (MS), Serving90
Network (SN) and Home Network (HN). The mobile station domain is composed
of the Mobile Equipment (ME), which is the mobile device, and the Universal
Subscriber Identity Module (USIM). The latter contains a worldwide unique
identification number, called International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI),
and other information shared with the Authentication Center (AuC) of the95
mobile operator (more details to follow). The Universal Terrestrial Radio Access
Network (UTRAN) is the access network for UMTS networks. The UTRAN
is composed of Radio Network Controllers (RNCs) and base stations, called
NodeB. The RNC is the control unit of the UTRAN network (a single RNC
can control a large number of NodeB, which have minimal functionality and100
mainly propagate messages between MS and RNC). The SN may belong to
the same provider of the USIM or to another provider, in areas not covered by
the provider of the USIM. The SN is composed of Mobile Switching Centers
(MSC) and Visitor Location Registers (VLR). An MSC is able to manage several
UTRAN networks. The VLR records information of the MS attached to the105
network and keeps track of the MS positions. The home network contains the
MSC (the operation is similar to those of the SN), and Home Location Registers
(HLR), which contain persistent information on registered operator users, and
records the locations of users. Finally, the Authentication Center (AuC) is used
to generate the authentication data. For each subscriber identified by the IMSI,110
it contains the security algorithms and an individual key (Ki) which is a copy
of the Ki permanently stored on the USIM card of the subscriber. The IMSI
value is public, and can be read from the device that mounts the USIM. The key,
however, must remain secret, and must never be revealed by USIM and AuC.
For this reason, the USIM provides functions, accessible to the ME, that can be115
used during the authentication phase in order to obtain temporary keys from Ki.
In this way, the secret Ki is never revealed to the ME.
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Figure 1: UMTS and LTE network architectures
2.1.2. LTE overview
Figure 1b depicts the architecture of an LTE network. Unlike the UTRAN,
where a RNC controls many NodeB, the Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio120
Access Network (E-UTRAN) is composed of only one type of element: the Evolved
NodeB (eNodeB or eNB). A Home-eNB (HeNB) performs the same function of
an eNodeB, but is optimized for deployment for smaller coverage than macro
eNodeB, such as indoor premises and public hotspots. Thus, in the following
of the paper the acronym eNB will be used to refer both to eNodeB an Home-125
eNB. The eNB are “logically” connected directly to the Mobility Management
Entity (MME). In reality, if the eNB-MME connections are protected with
IPsec, as 3GPP specification recommends, security gateways are placed between
E-UTRAN and MME to terminate IPsec tunnels. However, using IPsec tunnels
is at discretion of network operators (if a connection is physically protected, the130
IPSec protection can be omitted).
A major difference of the system architecture between LTE and UMTS
network is that features that were performed by RNC in the UMTS have
now been distributed between eNB and MME. The MME is the main control
component for the access network and initiates the authentication process, keeps135
track of the positions of MS, retrieves subscriptions of MS by HN, and manages
connectivity. In LTE, the “concatenation” of HLR and AuC is represented
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by the Home Subscriber Server (HSS), a single component that combines the
functionality of HLR and AuC.
2.1.3. Key hierarchies in LTE and UMTS140
Both in LTE and in UMTS, the first procedure done by a mobile device
that wants to connect to the network is the Authentication and Key Agreement
(AKA) procedure. The objective of this procedure is to establish the keys to be
used in cryptographic operations during communication between mobile device
and network. The keys are derived from the shared key Ki and from some145
randomly generated values. Details of authentication procedures can be found in
[1] (TS 33.401). The keys are renewed periodically, in order to prevent possible
attacks due to encryption of large volumes of data with the same keys.
The AKA procedure in UMTS networks determines two keys: the Cipher
Key (CK) and the Integrity Key (IK), respectively used to encrypt and check150
the integrity of data exchanged between MS and RNC. UMTS defines only one
class of traffic between MS and the network. Thus, only one pair of keys is
established (Figure 2, right side), which is used for all communications between
MS and RNC.
The LTE technology introduces significant differences in key management155
[1] (TS 33.821). LTE uses different keys for different protocols used between
the terminal and the different components of the serving network. These keys
are organized in a hierarchy as shown in Figure 2 (left side). At the top (root),
the key Ki shared between USIM and AuC. The other keys are derived from
Ki, following the levels of the hierarchy from top to bottom. Each level of the160
hierarchy indicates which parts of the network know the keys in the level. As
expected, the mobile device knows all the keys except Ki. As in UMTS, starting
from the key Ki, the CK and IK keys are derived, even if they are not actually
used for encryption and integrity in LTE networks, but rather are used to derive
the successive keys. Following the hierarchy, the KASME key, generated during165
authentication, is derived by the HSS and then sent to the MME (in the same
way, the MS derives the same key). The KeNB key is derived by MS and MME,
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Figure 2: LTE and UMTS key hierarchies
starting from KASME, and then sent to the eNB, which can thus activate the
security procedures between eNB and MS. However, KASME and KeNB are not
directly used in cryptographic operations. LTE provides two mechanisms of170
protection for two different classes of control traffic (Control Plane): Non Access
Stratum (NAS) traffic, and Access Stratum (AS) traffic. NAS traffic consist
of communications between MME and MS (forwarded in a “transparent” way
through the eNB), while AS traffic (also called Radio Resource Control (RRC)
traffic) includes the control messages between MS and eNB. For this reason, two175
keys are derived from KASME: KNASenc, used for encryption, and KNASint, used
for integrity checking of NAS messages. Similarly, from KeNB, the keys KRRCenc
and KRRCint are derived and used for AS messages. The user traffic (User Plane),
is encrypted using a different key, called KUPenc. Integrity protection is not
supported for this class of traffic.180
Finally, after a successful handover of the MS between two neighbor eNB, it
is necessary to renew the KeNB [1] (TS 33.401). To do this, the MME derives a
new value from the key KASME, called Next Hop key, which is used, along with
the previous KeNB, to generate the KeNB key (called K
?
eNB) used by the target
eNB after the handover. Further details on these procedures and their analysis185
can be found in [1] (TS 23.401 and TS 33.401) and [3] respectively.
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2.1.4. Handover procedures
Handover procedures are activated by the serving network (eNB in LTE, RNC
in UMTS) when the strength of the radio signal between a mobile station and the
current eNodeB/NodeB becomes too much degraded. The decision of performing190
a handover is taken by the eNB or RNC, which selects the target eNB/RNC from
a list of neighbors (the list is previously known). When a neighbor with the same
technology (LTE/UMTS) is not available for the handover, then a handover
to a network with other technology is executed. Intra-Handover procedures
are adopted when a user moves between different LTE cells, while Inter-RAT195
procedures are adopted while moving from a radio access technology (GSM,
UMTS, LTE, WiMAX or any other wireless technology) to another. These
procedures are described in the 3GPP TS 23.401 and TS 33.401 specifications
[1]. eNBs can be directly connected by an X2 interface which can be used to
perform handover procedures. Every eNB is connected to the MME via the S1200
interface. Both interfaces are IP based.
2.2. ProVerif overview
ProVerif [5] is a tool for automatic verification of cryptographic protocols,
using theorem-proving techniques, where the protocol actors and the attacker
are modeled according to the symbolic approach defined by Dolev and Yao [7].205
In this model, the attacker has complete control over communications channels
and can read, delete, modify messages in transit or forge new messages. The
symbolic representation of data and cryptography implies that encryption is
considered ideal: the attacker can decipher an encrypted message only when he
knows the right key.210
As the possible behaviors of the attacker are already pre-defined by the Dolev-
Yao approach, when using ProVerif it is enough to model the trusted actors of
the protocol, while the attacker model is already available inside ProVerif. An
important feature of ProVerif is its ability to model and analyze an unlimited
number of sessions of the protocol, even running in parallel.215
Because of the inherent undecidability of the formal verification problem [6],
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ProVerif may report false attacks, i.e. attacks which in reality are not possible.
As a consequence, when an attack is reported by ProVerif, in the form of an
execution trace that violates the specified property, it is necessary to carefully
analyze it in order to understand if it is a real attack. However, if a property is220
reported as satisfied, then it is guaranteed to be true (ProVerif builds a formal
proof for it), and no attack is feasible in the model.
3. Related work
Ben Henda and Norrman [3] recently used ProVerif to analyze the LTE
procedures related to session management (used to establish security algorithms225
between the mobile device and the network) and mobility (handover between
two LTE cells). The procedures analyzed are: Network Access Stratum (NAS)
security control procedure, i.e. security algorithm negotiation between MS and
MME, NAS Service Request Procedure (security algorithm negotiation between
MS and eNodeB), X2 handover, and S1 handover. The reported results show230
that secrecy and agreement properties hold as expected. However, differently
from our work, the analysis proposed in [3] does not consider the possibility
that data encryption may be disabled and that some channels may lack IPSec
protection, as allowed by the standard [1] (TS 33.401). Moreover, Ben Henda
and Norrman do not consider the possibility of having emergency calls, nor235
that an attacker may control one or more eNBs. Finally, we check a wider
set of properties, including, for example, weak-secrecy, i.e. the inability of the
adversary to distinguish a correct guess of a secret term from an incorrect guess.
The research community mainly focused on analyzing the Authentication
and Key Agreement (AKA) procedure and on proposing improvements in that240
procedure [11], [12], [13] and [9]. LTE and UMTS authentication procedures
are very similar, and only computation of keys and used algorithms differ. The
UMTS AKA was formally analyzed using BAN logic in TS 33.902 [1] and, due
to the similarity of the procedures, all analysis results carry over to LTE AKA.
Arapinis et al. [2] used ProVerif to analyze privacy aspects of UMTS. However,245
10
the paging procedure analyzed is the same in LTE and UMTS technologies, so
the results should be valid for both networks.
Qachri et al. [10] propose and analyze a system for handovers between different
wireless network technologies (e.g. 3G, 4G, WiFi, WiMax). The proposed system
has been formally verified with ProVerif. However, the paper does not provide250
an analysis of the LTE network defined by the 3GPP standards.
4. Security requirements and threats
The handover procedures have different security requirements, as specified
by the 3GPP standards. All the procedures, assuming that the mobile device is
authenticated with the network components (MSC in UMTS, eNB and MME255
in LTE) before the handover begins, must guarantee the validity of the same
authentication properties after the handover is completed, in the destination
network. Similarly, all the procedures must keep the secrecy of all the keys
used before, during and after the handover in the mobile device and in the
operator network. Consequently, the procedures for handover always activate260
the protection of the data transmitted with the exception for unauthenticated
emergency call when integrity checks and ciphering procedures cannot be applied.
Security threats derive from different causes. While physical damages and
technical failures are out of the scope of this work, our analysis considers
malicious threats originated by attackers who can eavesdrop, alter and drop265
communications between the mobile device and the operator network, and
among some components of the operator network, considering also the case
when emergency calls are ongoing. In this scenario, the threat consequences,
in the handover procedures, may be the disruption of authentication between
components and loss of data privacy.270
In order to counter security threats, communication among components of
the home and serving network should be secured by the mobile operators that
own the networks. While the risk of attacks on the MSC-MSC, MME-MME,
MME-MSC and MSC-RNC links is not very relevant, because the involved
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nodes are not physically accessible, the same is not true for the eNB-MME and275
eNB-eNB links, especially in the case of HeNBs, because these nodes are often
located in publicly accessible locations, and hence they may be tampered with by
a malicious attacker. The 3GPP TS 33.820 and 33.401 [1] specifications specify
that the eNB-MME and eNB-eNB connections should be protected by IPsec,
which guarantees authentication, integrity and confidentiality of data. Moreover,280
Security Gateways (SeGW) should be used to handle the IPsec connections in
the serving network. However, the 3GPP TS 33.401 [1] specification reports that,
if the interfaces are trusted (e.g. physically protected), the use of IPsec based
protection is not needed, depending on operator evaluations. In practice, the
promiscuity of IPSec protected connections and physically protected connections,285
summed to the fact that the number of LTE cells is rapidly growing, increases
the probability of misconfiguration in the networks, thus leading to possible
situations where some channels that should be protected by IPsec are not, thus
being accessible by malicious attackers. Moreover, some operators underestimate
the security issues and avoid using IPsec on their networks even when the risk290
of attacks on the channels is not negligible. Reasons might be several: some
operators fear that IPsec would increase both network complexity and traffic
latency, others simply underestimate the problem as, for example, they assume
that encryption is performed by applications, which is not always true. A clear
presentation of all the possible motivations that are leading several network295
operators to avoid using IPsec, and data about the adoption rate of IPSec, is
available in [8].
Finally, as HeNB are specifically designed to be placed in indoor spaces
and public hotspots, in some cases they can be easily physically accessed by
malicious attackers. The 3GPP TS 33.820 [1] specification describes all the300
security requirements that that must be fulfilled by eNBs and HeNBs. An
external attacker should not be able to access the sensitive data (e.g. private
keys) stored in the eNB, even if he gets physical access to the hardware of
the eNB. However, considering the complexity of eNBs (produced by different
manufactures), and the increasing diffusion of them, it is practically impossible to305
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ensure that all the eNBs are immune to external attacks. For this reason, the risk
of having compromised eNBs controlled by an attacker should be considered.
5. Modeling handover procedures for security verification
5.1. Modeling choices
This section presents the main modeling choices made in developing the310
formal models of the handover procedures. The final aim is to create models
that faithfully represent the procedures to be analyzed but that are as simple as
possible, so as to efficiently exploit the analysis tool ProVerif.
5.1.1. Omitting non-relevant data and operations
When modeling handover procedures for analyzing their security, only the315
data and operations related to cryptography and authentication need to be
included in the models, while information related to resource allocation and
relocation is not relevant for the security analysis and can be omitted.
5.1.2. Abstracting algorithms and algorithm identifiers in key derivation func-
tions320
Since perfect cryptography is assumed in the Dolev-Yao attacker model,
the handover models consider only whether encryption is enabled or not, no
matter which algorithm is chosen. Therefore, the algorithms and the algorithm
identifiers are abstracted away from key derivation functions.
5.1.3. Using a single fresh value to represent an IMSI325
An IMSI consists of three parts [1] (TS 23.003): (i) Mobile Country Code
(MCC), which identifies the country of domicile of the subscriber, (ii) Mobile
Network Code (MNC), which identifies the HN of the subscriber, and (iii) Mobile
Subscriber Identification Number (MSIN), which identifies the subscriber within
the HN. As the splitting of an IMSI into its components is not relevant for our330
analysis, in this work a single value is used to represent the IMSI. As subscribers
are uniquely identified by their IMSI, an IMSI is modeled as a fresh value, i.e. as
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a value generated before the start of the protocol and guaranteed to be unique.
Fresh values are considered by ProVerif initially unknown and unguessable by
the attacker, while in practice an active attacker can obtain a subscriber’s IMSI335
using so-called IMSI catchers. In order to take this into account, in the models
the MS sends its IMSI in clear over the public channel in the first message. Thus,
the attacker can learn the IMSI by eavesdropping on the public channel.
5.1.4. Modeling AKA procedures
As the handover procedures can be activated at any time, when the MS is340
already authenticated with the serving network, and the previous authentication
state is important, the model cannot just include the procedures themselves,
but it needs to represent what may happen before the procedures are activated.
Most notably, the model should include the last AKA procedure that has been
executed by the entities involved in the handover. As the inclusion of a full AKA345
procedure model would make the overall model too complex to be analyzed1, the
initial authentication is not fully modeled, but it is substituted by an equivalent
model, which creates the same security context that is assumed to be established
by the executed AKA procedure. This modeling choice was also adopted in [3].
In each AKA equivalent model, a fresh term used as IMSI is first generated350
by the MS, and whether to activate encryption or not is non-deterministically
chosen, so as to consider both cases.
In the LTE to UMTS, LTE X2 and LTE S1 handover models each MS also
generates a fresh term used as KASME (that in reality is established during the
AKA). Encryption selection and KASME are inserted as values in private perfect355
hash tables, shared only with the MME and called capab and keys. In these
tables, the corresponding IMSI is used as key for selecting the corresponding
values. So, the MME can retrieve the correct values for each MS from these hash
tables, by using the IMSI value (which is public). In other words, the agreement
1The inclusion of the complete model of AKA procedure caused the non-termination of the
ProVerif analysis.
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achieved by the initial AKA context setup is replaced by the two shared tables.360
Such tables, being private, cannot be accessed by the attacker. Here are the
ProVerif code segments that represent the handling of the shared data:
(∗ define two tables ∗)
table keys ( ident , asmeKey ) .
table capab ( ident , bool ) .365
(∗ generate fresh IMSI ∗)
new ims i : ident ;
(∗ nondeterministically chose a value between true and false ∗)
l e t cap ue : bool suchthat mem( cap ue , uecaps ) in370
(∗ generate a fresh term used as KASME ∗)
new kasme : asmeKey ;
(∗ insert new terms into the tables ∗)
insert capab ( imsi , cap ) ;
insert keys ( imsi , kasme ) ;375
(∗ retrieve terms from the tables, using IMSI as key ∗)
get keys(=imsi , kasme recv ) in
get capab(=imsi , cap recv ) in
Instead, in the UMTS to LTE models, in addition to nondeterministically380
selecting whether encryption is enabled or not, the MS also generates two fresh
terms used as ciphering and integrity keys in UMTS (CK,IK), that in reality
are established during the AKA. Similarly to the previous case, the selected
encryption capability and the (CK,IK) key pair are inserted as values in private
perfect hash tables, shared only with the MSC, called capab and keys. The385
corresponding IMSI value (which is public) is used as key for addressing these
tables, thus allowing the MSC to retrieve the correct values for each MS.
5.1.5. Modeling communication channels
Communication channels are modeled according to the considerations made
in Section 4, i.e. considering that the MSC-MSC, MME-MME, MME-MSC and390
MSC-RNC links are generally not physically accessible to attackers, while the
eNB-MME and eNB-eNB links may be accessible either because of misconfigu-
rations (i.e. not using IPsec on non physically protected links) or because an
attacker compromises one or more eNBs thus obtaining control of the commu-
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nication channels connected to those eNBs. Accordingly, in our analysis we395
assume that the MSC-MSC, MME-MME, MME-MSC and MSC-RNC links are
secure channels, i.e. not accessible by the attacker, whereas for the eNB-MME
and eNB-eNB links we explore both the case that the channels are secured, and
hence actually not accessible by the attacker, and the case that an attacker may
be able to control the channels.400
One simple possible way of modeling a secure channel in ProVerif is to use
a private channel, which, by definition, cannot be accessed by the attacker. A
second possible way is by encrypting the data that flow through the channel
with secret keys that are shared by the end-points of the channel, are not known
to the attacker, and are never disclosed. With this solution, the impossibility405
for the attacker to access the secure channel is guaranteed by the Dolev-Yao
attacker model which assumes perfect cryptography. The latter method is more
complex than the one using a private channel. For this reason, the ProVerif
models used in this work adopt the former approach:
free pubChannel : channel . (∗ public channel used to connect MS and eNB/RNC ∗)410
free secureChannelEnbMme : channel [ p r i va t e ] . (∗ private channel ∗)
Since the processes (corresponding to eNBs) that have been defined in the
ProVerif models used in this analysis do not create any fresh term (using
the ProVerif new statement), the scenario where an eNB is compromised and
controlled by the attacker corresponds exactly to the scenario where all the415
channels connected to that eNB are not secure (i.e. defined as ProVerif public
channels).
5.1.6. Modeling message headers
Each message has a header that identifies the type of message content. In our
model, headers are defined as constants. Each process that receives a message420
checks if the message header matches the one expected for the current input
instruction. If it does not match, the message is immediately discarded by the
process:
const HO REQUIRED: msgHdr . (∗ message header definition ∗)
in(=HO REQUIRED, . . . ) (∗ message input with header filter ∗)425
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This solution faithfully represents the way input messages have to be checked
but at the same time it keeps a low footprint on the state space size of the model.
5.1.7. Modeling capabilities
As in Dolev-Yao models the details about ciphering algorithms are omitted,
the same is done here: the model only represents whether the MS activates430
encryption (true value) or not (false value), but it does not represent other
choices (e.g. encryption algorithm). Note that encryption is optional, but
integrity protection is mandatory in LTE Control Plane (User Plane does not
support integrity protection). Hence, only the encryption capability has to be
represented. As said, the boolean value of this capability is nondeterministically435
chosen by the MS, so that the analysis considers both cases. The selected value
of the capability is disclosed to the attacker in the first message sent by the MS.
(∗ create a set containing only true and false values ∗)
l e t uecaps = cons s e t ( true , c ons s e t ( false , emptyset ) ) in
440
(∗ nondeterministically chose a value in the set ∗)
l e t cap ue : bool suchthat mem( cap ue , uecaps ) in
5.1.8. Omitting temporary identifiers
In the model, the IMSI is used to identify the MS, while in reality temporary
identifiers are used, i.e. Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) in UMTS,445
and Globally Unique Temporary Identifier (GUTI) in LTE. This abstraction
does not alter the security properties of the procedures, because the attacker
can obtain the IMSI from temporary identifiers, as demonstrated by Arapinis
et al. [2].
5.1.9. Representing data message exchanges450
Before and after the handover procedures take place, data messages can
be exchanged. This is taken into account, but only the exchange of two data
messages is included, one before the procedure starts and one after its completion,
because exchanging more messages would not add anything significant to the
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model. These messages are also used to check the secrecy of the data traffic455
when encryption is enabled.
5.1.10. Using a fresh term to model a counter
The LTE to UMTS handover uses a counter to derive the UMTS CK′ and
IK′ keys. This counter is called NAS downlink count, and represents the NAS
protocol message counter. The counter is bounded, and when it is about to wrap460
around a new AKA procedure is activated, in order to generate a new set of keys
(KASME, KeNB and all derived keys). Integer values are not directly supported by
ProVerif. The increment of the NAS downlink count value is therefore modeled
as the creation of a fresh new value, which is disclosed to the attacker in the
next message, as shown in the following ProVerif code:465
new nasDownlinkCount : bitstring ;
l e t ck ’ : ckKey = kdf ck ’ ( kasme , nasDownlinkCount ) in
let ik ’ : ikKey = kdf ik ’ ( kasme , nasDownlinkCount ) in
out ( pubChannel , nasDownlinkCount ) ;
The disclosure operation models the fact that a counter can be eventually470
guessed by an attacker, because it is a bounded integer value. Using a private
fresh term does not correctly represent a counter in the model, because a fresh
term is unguessable. Disclosing the fresh term used as counter is an acceptable
approximation because it adds the counter value to the attacker knowledge
database, and covers the case when the attacker guesses the counter value. This475
design choice was already adopted in [3].
5.1.11. Simplifying transmission paths
In order to reduce the complexity of the analysis, some messages in the
models do not follow the real path from source to target, but they follow a
simplified path. For example, the HANDOVER COMMAND message (in the480
LTE to UMTS and UMTS to LTE procedures) is directly exchanged between MS
and MME in the model. In reality, this message passes through the eNB node,
but the eNB does not alter the contents of the message, unless some physical
parameters, and the ciphering and integrity checking, done with the KRRCenc
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and KRRCint keys. Modeling the path through the eNB, with the additional485
ciphering and integrity checking, is possible, but leads to models that cause the
inability of ProVerif to terminate successfully. This problem has been avoided
by introducing a public direct channel between MS and MME, which replaces
the sequence of MS-eNB (public channel) and eNB-MME (private channel if
protected with IPSec or physical barriers, public otherwise) channels that in490
reality exist in the network. This replacement is a sound approximation of reality,
because it enlarges the possible attacks on the protocol (the MS-MME channel
is public, and the ciphering and integrity checking done with the KRRCenc and
KRRCint keys is omitted). Hence, if a security property holds on this model, it
must hold a fortiori when the real channels are used. Note that the encryption495
of messages between MS and MME with the KNASenc key is still modeled, when
required.
5.1.12. Modeling emergency sessions
LTE redefines the management of emergency calls. Emergency services are
handled by the IP Multimedia Subsystem [1] (TS 23.167), and can be activated500
even if the user is not authenticated (i.e. the MS does not mount a USIM card).
During emergency calls, a handover from LTE to UMTS can be performed if
necessary, while the handover from UMTS to LTE is not supported [1] (TS
23.401). The ProVerif models of the LTE to UMTS handover consider the
possibility that a user may activate emergency mode, in order to verify if an505
attacker can exploit data acquired during the emergency session handovers
to break the security of legitimate communications. Similarly, the models of
LTE to LTE handovers consider emergency sessions. Emergency session have
been modeled as separate processes, one for each actor, where encryption and
integrity checks are disabled. The same IMSI is used to start a MS process that510
models an emergency terminal (unauthenticated), and one process that follows
the authenticated session. By adopting this approach, the models consider the
possibility that the same IMSI is used at the same time for an authenticated
session and for an emergency session. This possibility in reality may happen if
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an attacker uses the IMSI to start an emergency session, while the legitimate515
user is connected to the network.
5.2. Procedure models
The next subsections give an informal description of the procedure models
used for security verification, in the form of charts. The models have been
derived from the procedure descriptions given in 3GPP TS 23.401 and TS 33.401520
[1] specifications, but omitting non security relevant data and operations and
following the design choices detailed above.
The equivalent model that substitutes the AKA procedures is inserted at
the beginning of each handover procedure model, in order to represent the
establishment of the security context assumed before starting the handover525
procedure itself. Just after the first two messages representing the initial AKA
equivalent model, a third message exchange is inserted before starting each
handover procedure itself. This message represents a user data exchange between
MS and eNB/MME/RNC, done before the handover procedure itself. These
initial messages can be seen, for example, in the chart in Figure 3, which530
represents the messages exchanged during a LTE to UMTS handover.
An excerpt of the ProVerif model used to verify the LTE to UMTS handover
procedure is shown in Appendix A while the complete handover models are
available for download at the URL http://staff.polito.it/riccardo.sisto/
lte.umts.handover/fullmodels.zip535
5.2.1. LTE to UMTS
Figure 3 depicts the simplified message exchange flow performed during Inter-
RAT handover from LTE to UMTS technologies, and represents the ProVerif
model used for the verification of the handover procedure.
After the first three context messages already explained, the handover is540
activated by the eNB with the HANDOVER REQUIRED message, which informs
the MME that the procedure must be performed for the user identified by the
IMSI contained in the message. The MME derives the new CK′ and IK′
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UMTS keys from the previous KASME and the NAS downlink count value. The
FORWARD RELOCATION REQUEST message provides the target MSC with545
the two keys and the IMSI. The MSC provides the target RNC with the keys just
received and the user identity (RELOCATION REQUEST message). Now the
RNC has all information required to communicate with the MS. RELOCATION
REQUEST ACK and FORWARD RELOCATION RESPONSE messages are
used to inform that the target UMTS network is ready to accept the connection550
from MS. The HANDOVER COMMAND is a NAS message that provides the
MS with the data (NAS downlink count) required for the derivation of CK′ and
IK′ in the MS. Then the MS sends a HANDOVER TO UTRAN COMPLETE
message to the target RNC for signalling that the MS is ready to use the
UMTS network. Finally, two messages are used to establish agreement upon the555
encryption algorithm, using the SMC (SECURITY MODE COMMAND) and
the SMC COMPLETE messages. The last message represents data exchange
after the handover, as already discussed.
5.2.2. UMTS to LTE
Handover from UMTS to LTE (Figure 4) is similar to the LTE to UMTS560
handover, but with the network roles reversed.
Handover is activated by the RNC with the RELOCATION REQUIRED
message, which informs the MSC that the procedure must be performed for
the user identified by the IMSI contained in the message. The MSC forwards
the data received from the MSC to the target MME, using the FORWARD565
RELOCATION REQUEST. The MME computes the new LTE keys following
these steps: (i) generates a fresh nonce, (ii) uses a derivation function to obtain
a K′ASME key from the nonce, CK and IK received from MSC, (iii) derives the
new KeNB, KNASenc and KNASint keys from K
′
ASME. The KeNB is sent, along
with the IMSI and the nonce, to the target eNB (HANDOVER REQUEST570
message), which confirms the reception with the HANDOVER REQUEST
ACKNOWLEDGE message. The eNB can therefore derive the KRRCenc, KRRCint
and KUPenc keys from the received KeNB. Then, the MME sends the FORWARD
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MS eNB
Generate imsi
Select encryption = true/false
Generate KASME
Insert table keys(imsi,kasme)
Insert table capab(imsi,encryption)
Derive keys from KASME
event(begMS_ENB(imsi,kenb))
MME
Get (kasme, encryption) from keys and capab tables
Derive keys from KASME
IMSI, KENB
Derive keys from KENBpayload LTE
event(endMS_ENB(imsi,kenb))
HO_REQUIRED, IMSI
Generate nasDownlinkCount
Derive CK’, IK’ from nasDownlinkCount and KASME 
event(begMME_MS(imsi,kasme,
       nasDownlinkCount,ck’,ik’))
MSC
FWD_RELOCATION_REQ, IMSI, CK', IK'
RNC
RELOCATION_REQ, IMSI, CK', IK'
RELOCATION_REQ_ACK, IMSI
FWD_RELOCATION_RES, IMSI
HO_COMMAND, nasDownlinkCount
HO_TO_UTRAN_COMPLETE, IMSI
payload UMTS
event(endMME_MS(imsi,kasme,
   nasDownlinkCount,ck’,ik’))
event(endRNC_MS(imsi,ck’,ik’))
event(begRNC_MS(imsi,ck’,ik’))
Derive CK’, IK’ from nasDownlinkCount 
    and KASME 
Generate fresh_numb
SECURITY_MODE_CMD_COMPLETE
integrity protected with KNASint 
integrity protected with IK’
ciphered with KUPenc 
integrity protected with IK’
ciphered with CK’ and 
integrity protected with IK’
SECURITY_MODE_CMD, ENCRYPTION, FRESH_NUMB
IMSI, encryption
Figure 3: LTE to UMTS handover
RELOCATION RESPONSE to the MSC, which forwards the nonce to the
MS with the HANDOVER COMMAND. Now the MS can derive the complete575
set of LTE keys from the received nonce and the previous CK and IK. When
the derivation process is completed, the MS informs the target eNB with the
HANDOVER TO E-UTRAN COMPLETE message. The next four messages
activate the security (i.e. agree upon the security algorithms) of the Access
Stratum and Non Access Stratum security, respectively between MS and eNB,580
and between MS and MME. The messages HANDOVER NOTIFY, FORWARD
RELOCATION COMPLETE and FORWARD RELOCATION COMPLETE
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ACKNOWLEDGE completes the handover procedure by signalling to the MSC
that the handover completed successfully. Finally, the last message represents
data exchange after the handover.585
ciphered with CK and 
integrity protected with IK
MS RNC
Generate imsi
Select encryption = true/false
Generate CK,IK
Insert table keys(imsi,(CK,IK))
Insert table capab(imsi,encryption )
event(begUE_RNC(imsi,CK,IK))
MSC
IMSI, encryption
Get ((CK,IK), encryption) from keys and capab tables
IMSI, CK, IK
payload UMTS
event(endUE_RNC(imsi,kenb))
RELOCATION_REQ, IMSI
MME
FWD_RELOCATION_REQ, IMSI, CK, IK
eNB
HO_REQ, IMSI, KENB, nonceMME
HO_REQ_ACK, IMSI, KENB, nonceMME
FWD_RELOC_RES, IMSI, nonceMME
HO_COMMAND, nonceMME
HO_TO_EUTRAN_COMPLETE, IMSI
payload LTE
event(endMME_UE(imsi,kasme’,
             ck,ik,nonceMME))
event(endENB_UE(imsi,
             (kenb,nonceMME))
event(begENB_UE(imsi,
          kenb,nonceMME))
Derive KASME’ from CK, IK, nonceMME
Derive keys from KASME’
NAS_SECURITY_MODE_CMD, IMSI
Generate nonceMME
Derive KASME’ from CK, IK, nonceMME
Derive keys from KASME’
event(begMME_UE(imsi,kasme’,ck,ik,nonceMME))
Derive keys from KENB
ciphered with CK and 
integrity protected with IK
HO_NOTIFY, IMSI
FWD_RELOCATION_COMPLETE, IMSI
FWD_RELOCATION_COMP_ACK, IMSI
NAS_SMC_COMPLETE, encryption
integrity protected with KNASINT
AS_SECURITY_MODE_CMD, encryption
integrity protected with KASINT
AS_SECURITY_MODE_CMD_COMPLETE
integrity protected with KASINT
ciphered with KUPENC
Figure 4: UMTS to LTE handover
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5.2.3. LTE X2
The X2 handover (Figure 5) is an LTE to LTE handover procedure. The
fundamental characteristic of the X2 procedure is the fact that the handover is
performed between two eNB, without MME intervention. Indeed, the MME is
informed that the handover has been performed after the procedure completed.590
An X2 handover can be executed between two eNB only if they are directly
connected via the X2 interface. Otherwise, an S1 handover must be performed
(Section 5.2.4).
The X2 handover is initiated by the SeNB (Source eNodeB) deriving the
K?eNB key from the current KeNB and the Target Cell ID, an identifier that is595
associated by the SeNB to the TeNB (Target eNodeB). The Target Cell ID is
modeled as a fresh term that is disclosed to the attacker, because this ID is
known by any MS that connects to the eNB, thus the attacker can obtain it
by starting a legitimate connection to the eNB. The SeNB informs the TeNB
that the handover is starting, by sending K?eNB, MS identity and encryption600
capability in the HANDOVER REQUEST message.
The TeNB derives the new set of keys (KRRCenc, KRRCint and KUPenc)
from the received K?eNB, and informs the SeNB that it is ready to accept the
connection from MS (HANDOVER REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGE message).
Then, the SeNB sends all the information required (encryption capability, that605
the MS checks to be corresponding to the value selected at the beginning, and
Target Cell ID) to the MS in a RRC CONNECTION RECONFIGURATION
message. Now the MS can derive the new K?eNB key and all the subsequent keys
(KRRCenc, KRRCint and KUPenc) that are used to communicate with the TeNB.
Thus, the MS disconnects from the SeNB and sends a RRC CONNECTION610
RECONFIGURATION COMPLETE message to the TeNB. When the TeNB
receives this message, it can start to communicate with the MS. Then, the TeNB
informs the MME that an X2 handover has been performed with the PATH
SWITCH REQUEST. The MME derives two new keys, called next hop key 1
(from KeNB and KASME) and next hop key 2 (from next hop key 1 and KASME).615
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The next hop key 2 is sent to the TeNB in the PATH SWITCH REQUEST
ACKNOWLEDGE message, and must be used by the TeNB to derive another
K?eNB for the next handover. This implies a two-step forward key separation,
because even though the SeNB can derive the key used for the TeNB, it cannot
derive a key for the next target eNB. Finally, the last message represents data620
exchange after the handover.
MS SeNB
Generate imsi
Select encryption = true/false
Generate KASME
Insert table keys(imsi,kasme)
Insert table capab(imsi,encryption)
Derive keys from KASME
TeNB
IMSI, encryption
IMSI, KENB
Derive keys from KENB
payload LTE 1
event(endMS_ENB(imsi,kenb))
HO_REQUEST, IMSI, KENB*
Derive keys from KENB*
MME
PATH_SWITCH_REQUEST, IMSI
PATH_SWITCH_REQUEST_ACK, NH_KEY_2
RRC_CONN_RECONF_COMPLETE
payload LTE 2
event(endENB_MS(imsi,kenb*))
Derive NH_KEY_1 from
              KENB and KASME
Derive NH_KEY_2 from 
              NH_KEY_1 and KASME  
RRC_CONN_RECONF, encryption, Target_Cell_ID
event(begMS_ENB(imsi,kenb))
Get (kasme, encryption) from
      keys and capab tables
Derive keys from KASME
Derive KENB* from KENB and Target_Cell_ID
HO_REQUEST_ACK
ciphered with KRRCENC and integrity 
protected with KRRCINT
Derive KENB* from KENB and Target_Cell_ID
Derive new keys from KENB*
event(begENB_MS(imsi,kenb*))
ciphered with KRRCENC and integrity 
protected with KRRCINT
ciphered with KUPenc 
ciphered with KUPenc 
Knows Target_Cell_ID
Figure 5: LTE X2 handover
5.2.4. LTE S1
The S1 handover (Figure 6) is an LTE to LTE handover procedure. Differently
from the X2 handover (Section 5.2.3), the S1 handover procedure requires the
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intervention of the MME.625
The S1 handover is initiated by the SeNB deriving the K?eNB key from the
current KeNB and the Target Cell ID (an identifier that is associated by the SeNB
to the TeNB, modeled as a fresh term that is disclosed to the attacker). The
SeNB informs the MME of the necessity that a handover is required, by sending
K?eNB, MS identity and encryption capability in the HANDOVER REQUIRED630
message.
The MME derives two new keys, called next hop key 1 (from KeNB and
KASME) and next hop key 2 (from next hop key 1 and KASME). The next hop
key 2 is sent to the TeNB, along with the MS identity (IMSI) in the HANDOVER
REQUEST message. The TeNB derives the new K?eNB key from the received635
next hop key 2 and the Target Cell ID, which is known from the beginning for
simplicity. Then, the TeNB derives the following KRRCenc, KRRCint and KUPenc
keys. Meanwhile, the MME sends the HANDOVER COMMAND message to
the SeNB, which forwards to the MS the message along with the encryption
capability (that the MS checks to be equal to the value selected at the beginning)640
and the Target Cell ID.
The MS can derive the new set of keys: the KRRCenc, KRRCint and KUPenc
keys will be used to communicate with the TeNB. Then, the MS disconnects
from SeNB and initiates the message exchange with the TeNB by sending the
HANDOVER CONFIRM message.645
Finally, the last message represents data exchange after the handover.
The S1 handover procedure implies a one-step forward key separation: the
SeNB cannot derive the key used in TeNB when the handover is completed,
because the keying material of the TeNB is provided directly by the MME.
5.3. Security properties specification650
The main security properties that the handover procedures are expected to
guarantee have been specified as follows (the way these properties have been
expressed in ProVerif is shown in Appendix A):
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MS SeNB
Generate imsi
Select encryption = true/false
Generate KASME
Insert table keys(imsi,kasme)
Insert table capab(imsi,encryption)
Derive keys from KASME
TeNB
IMSI, encryption
IMSI, KENB
Derive keys from KENBpayload LTE 1
event(endMS_ENB(imsi,kenb))
HO_REQUIRED, IMSI, KENB*
MME
HO_REQUEST_ACK
HO_COMMAND
event(endENB_MS(imsi,kenb*))
Derive NH_KEY_1 from KENB and KASME
Derive NH_KEY_2 from NH_KEY_1 and KASME  
HO_REQUEST, IMSI, NH_KEY_2
HO_COMMAND, encryption, Target_Cell_ID
event(begMS_ENB(imsi,kenb))
Get (kasme, encryption) from keys and 
capab tables
Derive keys from KASME and NAS _UL_COUNT
Derive KENB* from KENB and Target_Cell_ID
HO_CONFIRM
ciphered with KRRCENC and integrity 
protected with KRRCINT
event(begENB_MS(imsi,kenb*))
ciphered with KRRCENC and integrity 
protected with KRRCINT
payload LTE 2
ciphered with KUPenc 
ciphered with KUPenc 
Knows Target_Cell_ID
Derive NH_KEY_1 from KENB and KASME
Derive NH_KEY_2 from NH_KEY_1 and KASME
Derive KENB* from KENB and Target_Cell_ID
Derive new keys from KENB*
Knows Target_Cell_ID
Derive KENB* from NH_KEY_2 and Target_Cell_ID
Derive new keys from KENB*
Figure 6: LTE S1 handover
• Secrecy of keys: all the keys involved in the handover procedures must
remain secret.655
• Conditional secrecy of payloads: in UMTS and LTE, encryption of data
between MS and SN is optional, unless an emergency call without authen-
tication is running, in which case encryption is disabled. Accordingly, the
terms payloadLTE and payloadUMTS, used to represent the data trans-
ferred between MS and eNB/RNC (when an emergency session is not660
active), must be kept secret if encryption is enabled. Note that the secret
payload referred by this property is not the payload of emergency sessions
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messages, which is represented in the model by another term and is not
protected (the attacker can read and modify it).
• Forward secrecy and backward secrecy of keys: the compromise of a secret665
key must not affect the confidentiality of future keys (forward secrecy) and
of earlier keys (backward secrecy). In the handover from LTE to UMTS,
forward secrecy is specified as the inability of the attacker to derive UMTS
keys (CK′, IK′) when he knows KeNB. Likewise, in the handover from
UMTS to LTE, forward secrecy is specified as the inability of the attacker670
to derive LTE keys (K′ASME, KeNB) when he knows CK and IK. In both X2
and S1 LTE to LTE handovers, forward secrecy is specified as the inability
of the attacker to derive the K?eNB key used in the target eNB when he
knows the KeNB used in the source eNB. Backward secrecy is defined as
the inability of the attacker to derive KeNB from CK
′ and IK′ in the first675
case, to derive CK and IK from KeNB in the second case, and to derive
KeNB from K
?
eNB in the LTE S1 and X2 cases.
• Immunity to off-line guessing attacks: a term is a weak-secret if it is
vulnerable to brute-force off-line guessing, and the attacker has the ability
to verify if a guessed value is indeed the weak-secret without further680
interaction after an execution of the protocol. In the handover models, the
payloads are data that could be guessed, so it is specified that they must
not be weak-secrets.
• Authentication: in the LTE to UMTS and UMTS to LTE handover models,
the following authentication properties between the MS and the SN (eNB685
and RNC) are specified : (i) the MS is authenticated to the source network,
(ii) the MS is authenticated to the target network (if the handover procedure
has completed successfully), (iii) each time the MS successfully concludes
a handover, then the MME previously derived the same keys (K′ASME or
CK′/IK′). In the LTE to LTE handover models (both X2 and S1), two690
authentication queries similar to the first two ones of the LTE to UMTS and
UMTS to LTE handovers have been defined: (i) the MS is authenticated
to the source eNB, and (ii) the MS is authenticated to the target eNB
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(if the handover procedure has completed successfully). The third query
about the identity of derived keys is useless in this case, because no new695
key is derived, but the KASME, KNASenc and KNASint keys, shared between
MS and MME, do not change during the handover.
6. Verification results
As already explained, all handover types have been analyzed considering
both the case that the eNB-MME link includes IPsec or physical protection, and700
the case that it does not. This produces two different models for each handover
type: the two models differ only in the definition of the eNB-MME channel
(private in the first case, public in the latter case).
It is worth noting that each property has been verified independently. This is
necessary not only for limiting the complexity of the analysis, but also because705
different properties require different assumptions. For example, when verifying
backward/forward secrecy, some keys are intentionally disclosed to the attacker,
while the same must not happen when verifying other properties.
6.1. LTE to UMTS
Table 1 resumes the results of the formal analysis of the LTE to UMTS710
handover model.
The second column of Table 1 contains the results of the analysis when the
channel between eNB and MME is private, i.e. the adversary has no access to it.
These results confirm that all the expected properties hold: all keys (KASME,
KeNB and derived) remain secret; forward and backward secrecy are valid; the715
payloads are conditionally secret and are not weak-secrets, and authentication
properties hold.
The third column of Table 1 refers to the case of a public eNB-MME channel
(the adversary can spoof, delete and transmit new messages over the channel).
In this scenario, the attacker can know a subset of the LTE keys: KeNB and the720
derived keys KRRCenc, KRRCint and KUPenc. However, KASME and the UMTS
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keys (CK′/IK′) are kept secret. The disclosure of KeNB makes the LTE payload
not secret (the attacker can derive the ciphering key KUPenc), which also invalids
the immunity to guessing attacks on the LTE payload. Instead, the secrecy of the
UMTS payload is preserved, because CK remains secret, as well as the immunity725
to guessing attacks on the UMTS payload. In this scenario, backward secrecy is
not valid: the attacker directly knows KeNB. Instead, forward secrecy is kept: the
attacker never knows KASME, so he has no way to derive CK
′ and IK′. Finally,
the authentication between MS and eNB does not hold: an attacker can force a
handover of the MS from LTE to UMTS. In fact, the attacker, knowing the IMSI730
and having access to the eNB-MME channel, can initiate an arbitrary handover
by sending a forged HANDOVER REQUIRED message to the MME. The MS
cannot recognize the attacker because the handover procedure continues as in a
regular handover, and receives a genuine HANDOVER COMMAND message
from the network. The attacker never knows KASME: if the handover completes735
in the MS, then the MME must have previously derived, in a corresponding
session, the CK′ and IK′ keys from KASME, so MME and MS are correctly
authenticated during the handover. Similarly, the attacker has no access to the
3G serving network and, from the previous properties, to the CK′ and IK′ keys:
the attacker cannot alter communications between RNC and MS and, when the740
handover procedure completes, the MS and the UMTS SN are authenticated.
6.2. UMTS to LTE
The same considerations made for the two previous scenarios are also appli-
cable to the other handover procedure, from UMTS to LTE (second and third
column in Table 2), with only some differences. The only results that differ745
are the ones about forward and backward secrecy. In this handover scenario,
forward secrecy does not hold because if the attacker knows CK and IK, he can
decrypt all the messages between MS and the UMTS network. In this way, the
adversary can read the nonce, transmitted from the RNC to the MS, that is
used by MME and MS, along with CK and IK, to derive the K′ASME key, and750
subsequently all the LTE keys. Instead, backward secrecy holds: an attacker
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LTE to UMTS
eNB-MME channel private public
Secrecy of keys true
false for KeNB and keys derived
from KeNB
Conditional secrecy of LTE
payload
true false
Conditional secrecy of UMTS
payload
true true
Forward secrecy true true
Backward secrecy true false
Immunity to off-line guessing
attacks
true
false for payloadLTE, true for
payloadUMTS
Auth. MS-eNB true false
Auth. MS-MME true true
Auth. MS-RNC true true
Table 1: Analysis results: LTE to UMTS handover
who knows KeNB cannot derive the previous CK and IK keys.
The results about authentication are the same, albeit their explanation is
different. Lack of authentication between MS and eNB, in the last scenario,
makes the adversary able to alter all subsequent Access Stratum and User Plane755
communications between MS and eNB. However, the attacker cannot read and
modify Non Access Stratum messages between MS and MME. For this reason
MS-MME authentication remains valid: if the handover completes in the MS,
then the MME ran a session where the KASME key was derived, so MME and
MS are authenticated during the handover. Finally, before starting the handover,760
MS-RNC are authenticated, as confirmed by the last query, because the attacker
has no access to the UMTS network.
6.3. LTE X2
Table 3 resumes the results of the formal analysis of the LTE X2 handover
model.765
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UMTS to LTE
eNB-MME channel private public
Secrecy of keys true
false for KeNB and keys derived
from KeNB
Conditional secrecy of LTE
payload
true false
Conditional secrecy of UMTS
payload
true true
Forward secrecy false false
Backward secrecy true true
Immunity to off-line guessing
attacks
true
false for payloadLTE, true for
payloadUMTS
Auth. MS-eNB true false
Auth. MS-MME true true
Auth. MS-RNC true true
Table 2: Analysis results: UMTS to LTE handover
In this handover scenario, for the three channels has been considered the
possibility that each channel may be insecure. Thus, a total of eight combinations
are possible, when channels are alternatively considered as private or public
channels. In certain cases, ProVerif is not able to verify all the properties
(“unres”, i.e. unresolved, cells in Table 3).770
In the X2 handover, forward secrecy never holds, as already known from the
specifications [1] (TS 33.401).
The columns of Table 3 confirm that the security properties of the current
handover procedure are not influenced by the protection on the TeNB-MME
channel: this can be explained because the only key that is transmitted on775
that channel is the Next Hop Key 2, which will be eventually used in the next
handover. However, the next handover may be compromised if the attacker has
the Next Hop Key 2. If this happens, during the following handover the security
properties will not hold.
The fourth and fifth columns consider the case when the the SeNB-TeNB780
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channel is protected while the SeNB-MME channel lacks protection. In this
scenario, the attacker obtains KeNB from the second message, and can derive all
the subsequent keys. Moreover, if the TeNB-MME channel is also unprotected
(fifth column), the attacker can read the Next Hop Key 2 sent by the MME.
Conditional secrecy of payloads is not true, because the ciphering keys are785
disclosed (ProVerif is not able to resolve the query about payload 2). This
implies that the payloads are also reported as weak-secrets, because the attacker
knows the exact values from the previous point. Similarly, backward secrecy is
not valid because KeNB is directly known by the attacker. Finally, authentication
does not hold: the attacker obtains all the keys needed in the handover procedure,790
thus he can act as fake SeNB and TeNB. Unfortunately, ProVerif cannot resolve
the query about the authentication between MS and SeNB, i.e. it cannot complete
this verification. However, it can be argued that if the attacker has KeNB, he
can replicate the behaviour of the SeNB, thus invalidating this authentication.
The sixth to ninth columns of Table 3 consider the case when the channel795
between SeNB and TeNB (the X2 interface) is not protected. In this scenario
it is clear that the attacker always knows K?eNB. The direct effect is that the
authentication between MS and TeNB never holds: in fact the attacker may
operate as fake TeNB because all the keys are derived from K?eNB. In particular,
the attacker can arbitrarily force a handover execution, by sending a forged800
HANDOVER REQUEST message to the TeNB. Moreover, Table 3 shows that the
protection of the TeNB-MME channel does not influence the security properties
apart from the fact that the Next Hop Key 2 is disclosed if the TeNB-MME and
SeNB-TeNB channels are public. When the SeNB-MME channel is private (the
attacker does not know KeNB and KUPenc), the conditional secrecy of payload 1805
(sent before the handover begins) holds, while payload 2 (sent after the handover
completion) is always known by the attacker (because it is ciphered with the
KUPenc derived from K
?
eNB), thus the conditional secrecy of payload 2 is false
(ProVerif is not able to resolve the queries when the the SeNB-MME channel
is public). Similarly, backward secrecy holds only if the SeNB-MME channel is810
private. Otherwise, the attacker can obtain KeNB and invalidate the property.
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Moreover, payload 1 cannot be guessed if the SeNB-MME channel is private:
the attacker cannot derive KUPenc because he does not know KeNB. Finally,
authentication between MS and SeNB holds only if the SeNB-MME channel is
protected. If it is not, the attacker can behave as a fake SeNB (ProVerif is not815
able to resolve this query).
6.4. LTE S1
Table 4 resumes the results of the formal analysis of the LTE S1 handover
model.
In this handover scenario, for the SeNB-MME and TeNB-MME channels,820
both the case of protected channel and the case of unprotected channel have
been considered, for a total of four different scenarios (note that in this kind of
handover there is no SeNB-TeNB channel, see Section 5.2.4).
The second column of Table 4 considers the case when both channels are
private: all the security properties are verified. Conversely, if both channels are825
modeled as public channels, none of the properties is verified (ProVerif is not
even able to resolve all the queries), as reported in the fifth column of Table 4.
If the SeNB-MME channel is private and the TeNB-MME channel is public
(third column of Table 4), the attacker may obtain all the keys used in the TeNB,
because all the keys are derived from the Next Hop 2 and the Target Cell ID830
(which is public). The attacker does not know the keys used in the SeNB, which
implies that the conditional secrecy of payload 1 holds. ProVerif is not able to
resolve the query about payload 2. However, payload 2 is known by the attacker
because he knows all the keys used in the TeNB. The fact that the attacker has
all the keys derived in the TeNB also falsifies the queries about forward secrecy835
(because the attacker may derive K?eNB), and about the MS-TeNB authentication
(the attacker has all the keys to act as TeNB). Backward secrecy is verified,
which can be explained because the attacker has no way to obtain the initial
KeNB. Finally, payload 1 cannot be guessed offline, but payload 2 is known by
the attacker because it is received by the TeNB, and the attacker has the keys840
used in th TeNB.
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LTE X2
SeNB-
TeNB
channel
private public
SeNB-
MME
channel
private public private public
TeNB-
MME
channel
private public private public private public private public
Secrecy of
keys
true true
false
for
KeNB
and de-
rived
false
for
KeNB
and de-
rived
and
NH2
key
false
for
K?eNB
and de-
rived
false
for
K?eNB
and de-
rived
false
(except
KASME
and
NH1
key)
false
(except
KASME,
NH1
and
NH2
keys)
Conditional
secrecy of
LTE 1
payload
true true false false true true false false
Conditional
secrecy of
LTE 2
payload
true true unres unres false false unres unres
Forward
secrecy
false false false false false false false false
Backward
secrecy
true true false false true true false false
Immunity
to off-line
guessing
attacks
true true false false
true
for
pay-
load 1,
false
for
pay-
load
2
true
for
pay-
load 1,
false
for
pay-
load
2
false false
Auth.
MS-SeNB
true true unres unres true true unres unres
Auth.
MS-TeNB
true true false false false false false false
Notes:
unres = unresolved, i.e. ProVerif cannot resolve the query
NH1 = Next Hop 1 key
NH2 = Next Hop 2 key
Table 3: Analysis results: LTE X2 handover
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The last scenario, which results are reported in the fourth column of Table 4,
considers the case when the SeNB-MME channel is public and the TeNB-MME
channel is private. ProVerif is not able to resolve the queries about the secrecy
of the keys. However, from the model it is clear that the attacker knows KeNB845
(from the second message sent by the MME to the SeNB), and is able to derive
all the keys used by the SeNB. Thus, the attacker can obtain payload 1, which
falsifies its conditional secrecy and off-line guessing resistance. Finally, the
attacker may act as SeNB: the authentication between MS and SeNB is not
verified by ProVerif, and the attacker can force a handover execution, by sending850
a forged HANDOVER REQUIRED message to the MME (this is also possible
when both channels are public, fifth column). Since the TeNB-MME channel
is private, the attacker does not know the keys used in the TeNB. Payload 2
remains conditionally secret and resistant to off-line guessing. Similarly, forward
secrecy holds, which can be explained because K?eNB, derived from TeNB, is not855
known by the attacker, while the backward secrecy query is falsified because the
attacker directly knows KeNB from the second message (sent by the MME to the
SeNB). Finally, the authentication between MS and TeNB holds, which can be
explained because the attacker is not able to obtain the keys used in the TeNB.
7. Conclusions860
LTE is the most recent standard in communication systems developed by
3GPP. This paper presented a thorough formal security analysis of handover
procedures activated when a mobile device moves between LTE and UMTS
networks or between LTE nodes. The tool used to formalize models and to
verify procedures is ProVerif, which uses symbolic models based on perfect865
cryptography assumptions. The results about UMTS-LTE handovers already
presented in [4] have been extended with the analysis of new verification scenarios
in the presence of emergency calls (in order to check if an attacker can exploit
emergency sessions to break the security of the network) and by giving full
details about the formal models used for verification and the design choices870
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LTE S1
SeNB-MME
channel
private public
TeNB-MME
channel
private public private public
Secrecy of keys true
unres for HH2
and TeNB keys
unres unres
Conditional
secrecy of LTE 1
payload
true true unres unres
Conditional
secrecy of LTE 2
payload
true unres true unres
Forward secrecy true false true false
Backward secrecy true true false false
Immunity to
off-line guessing
attacks
true
true for payload
1, false for
payload 2
true for payload
2, false for
payload 1
false
Auth. MS-SeNB true true unres unres
Auth. MS-TeNB true false true false
Table 4: Analysis results: LTE S1 handover
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adopted in their definition. The results about LTE to LTE handovers (X2 and S1)
that were available in the literature have been completed with new results that
consider new kinds of properties and new assumptions not previously considered
in the literature. In particular, the results already presented by Ben Henda and
Norrman [3], regrading authentication and secrecy in LTE X2 and S1 handovers,875
have been confirmed by this work. For all the considered handover procedures,
secrecy of ciphering and integrity keys, conditional secrecy of payloads, forward
and backward secrecy of keys, immunity to guessing attacks on payloads and
authentication between network components have been analyzed.
3GPP specifies that mobile operators can decide to omit IPsec protection880
on eNB-MME and eNB-eNB channels, if the interfaces are trusted. However,
a definition of “trusted” is not given by 3GPP specifications, but it is left to
the mobile operators’ discretion. As currently several operators do not protect
the eNB-MME and eNB-eNB channels, as reported in [8], the analysis was
conducted by considering both the cases of protected and unprotected eNB-885
MME and eNB-eNB channels. Moreover, since HeNB are often placed in easily
accessible locations, the analysis considered the possibility that an attacker
succeeds in obtaining the control of the HeNB.
Results confirm that, under the assumptions made, almost all the properties
that have been considered hold when eNB-MME and eNB-eNB channels are890
protected in all the four handover procedures. The only property that does not
hold is forward secrecy (as defined in Section 5.2) in the UMTS to LTE and the
X2 handovers. Moreover, it is possible to confirm that the emergency sessions
do not disclose to the attackers data that can be used to break network security
during handover procedures.895
In the case of unprotected eNB-MME or eNB-eNB channels, or if the eNB
connected to those channels is controlled by the attacker, results show which
properties are broken and which remain valid under the assumptions made. When
having access to the eNB-MME channels, an attacker can force a handover from
LTE to UMTS, or control the Access Stratum and User Plane communications900
after a handover from UMTS to LTE. However, the main LTE key (KASME) and
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the UMTS keys (CK′/IK′) are kept secret.
In the LTE to LTE procedures a greater number of combinations are possible,
because the channels that may be considered insecure are 2 (S1 handover), or 3
(X2 handover). In both the handover cases, the attacker can alter sections, or905
the entire handover process, depending on which channels he controls.
Finally, results highlight that the handover procedure from UMTS to LTE
does not provide forward secrecy of the keys, with respect to the definition given
in Section 5.2. Similarly, the X2 handover never guarantees forward secrecy, but
this is a precise 3GPP design choice in order to obtain a very fast handover910
procedure, which is particularly useful for fast-moving users and devices.
A total of 16 ProVerif models have been analyzed. All the handover procedure
were verified considering the possibility that the attacker can control the channel
between eNB and MME and between eNB and eNB.
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Appendix A. Proverif Models
Figure A.7 contains an excerpt of the ProVerif model used to verify the LTE
to UMTS handover procedure. The LTE to UMTS handover ProVerif model
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is used here for describing how the security properties specified in section 5.3
have been expressed in ProVerif. All the other handover models follow the same960
modeling technique.
The security properties specified in section 5.3 have been expressed in ProVerif
as follows (line numbers refer to the LTE to UMTS ProVerif code in Figure A.7):
• Secrecy of keys: secrecy is expressed by means of the ProVerif attacker
query (lines 4, 5).965
• Conditional secrecy of payloads: the fact that the terms payloadLTE and
payloadUMTS, used to represent the data transferred between MS and
eNB/RNC (when an emergency session is not active), must be kept secret
if encryption is enabled is expressed using an equivalent formulation: if
the attacker knows the secret payload, then the event disableEnc must970
have been previously executed (lines 13, 14).
• Forward secrecy and backward secrecy of keys : ProVerif provides a dedicated
feature (the phase instruction) for checking forward and backward secrecy.
The following lines show how forward secrecy is verified in the LTE to
UMTS handover 2:975
. . .
(∗ verify forward secrecy ∗)
query at tacke r (payloadUMTS) phase 1 .
. . .
l e t processMS ( uecaps : bset ) =980
(∗ complete handover procedure ∗)
. . .
phase 1 ;
out ( pubChannel , ( kenb ue ) ) ;
0 .985
. . .
The phase instruction in the processMS process breaks the protocol into
two phases: phase 0 (the default phase) contains all the instructions and
communications that are performed before reaching the instruction phase
1. When the latter instruction is reached (i.e. the handover has completed990
2these lines are not displayed in Figure A.7 for simplicity
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successfully) a new phase (phase 1) begins. In phase 1, only the statements
defined after the phase 1 instruction are executed (in this case, the KeNB
key is disclosed), but the adversary keeps all the knowledge acquired during
the previous phase (e.g. all the messages exchanged), and integrates it with
new terms, if possible (the KeNB key in the example). Similarly, the queries995
that specify a phase n condition are evaluated only after the beginning of
phase n. In this excerpt of code, ProVerif evaluates the query when the
attacker knows KeNB.
• Immunity to off-line guessing attacks: The query weaksecret, available
in ProVerif to specify that a term must not be a weak-secret, i.e. that1000
the adversary must not be able to distinguish a correct guess of the secret
term from an incorrect guess, is used to specify that the payloads must
not be weak secrets (lines 16, 17).
• Authentication: Authentication properties are specified as correspondence
queries in ProVerif (lines 6 - 12, 29). For example, the authentication1005
requirement expressed as
inj-event(endMS ENB(x1,x2)) ⇒ inj-event(begMS ENB(x1,x2))
means that each time the event endMS ENB(x1,x2) in the eNB process
occurs, the MS process has previously started a session of the protocol (i.e.
event begMS ENB(x1,x2) has occurred).1010
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1 free pubChannel : channel . free secureChannelEnbMme : channel [ p r i va t e ] .
2 const HO REQUIRED: msgHdr . const FWD RELOC REQ: msgHdr . const ID : msgHdr .
3 table keys ( ident , asmeKey ) . table capab ( ident , bool ) .
4 query at tacke r (new kasme ue ) .
5 query at tacke r ( kdf enb (new kasme ue ) ) .
6 query x1 : ident , x2 : enbKey ;
7 inj−event (endMS ENB( x1 , x2 ) ) ==> inj−event (begMS ENB( x1 , x2 ) ) .
8 query x1 : ident , x2 : ckKey , x3 : ikKey ;
9 inj−event (endRNC MS( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) ==> inj−event (begRNC MS( x1 , x2 , x3 ) ) .
10 query x1 : ident , x2 : asmeKey , x3 : bitstring , x4 : ckKey , x5 : ikKey ;
11 inj−event (endMME MS( x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 , x5 ) )
12 ==> inj−event (begMME MS( x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 , x5 ) ) .
13 query at tacke r ( payloadLTE ) ==> event ( d i sab leEnc ) .
14 query at tacke r (payloadUMTS) ==> event ( d i sab leEnc ) .
15 . . .
16 weaksecret payloadLTE .
17 weaksecret payloadUMTS .
18 . . .
19 l e t processMS ( uecaps : bset ) =
20 new ims i ue : ident ;
21 l e t cap ue : bool suchthat mem( cap ue , uecaps ) in
22 new kasme ue : asmeKey ;
23 insert capab ( imsi ue , cap ue ) ; insert keys ( ims i ue , kasme ue ) ;
24 (∗ key derivation from Kasme ∗)
25 l e t knasenc ue : nasEncKey = kd f nas enc ( kasme ue ) in
26 l e t knas in t ue : nasIntKey = k d f n a s i n t ( kasme ue ) in
27 l e t kenb ue : enbKey = kdf enb ( kasme ue ) in
28 . . .
29 event begMS ENB( imsi ue , kenb ue ) ;
30 out ( pubChannel , ( ID , ims i ue , cap ue ) ) ;
31 i f cap ue = true then ( (∗ encryption enabled inside this branch ∗)
32 . . .
33 ) else (
34 i f cap ue = fa l se then ( (∗ encryption disabled inside this branch ∗)
35 event disab leEnc ;
36 . . .
37 ) else ( 0 )
38 ) .
39 . . .
40 l e t processMME =
41 in ( pubChannel , (=ID , imsi mme : ident , cap mme recv : bool ) ) ;
42 get keys(=imsi mme , kasme mme) in ( get capab(=imsi mme , cap mme) in
43 l e t knasenc mme : nasEncKey = kd f nas enc (kasme mme) in
44 new nasDownlinkCount : bitstring ;
45 l e t ck ’ mme : ckKey = kdf ck ’ ( kasme mme , nasDownlinkCount ) in
46 l e t ik ’ mme : ikKey = kdf ik ’ ( kasme mme , nasDownlinkCount ) in
47 . . .
48 ) .
49 process
50 l e t uecaps = cons s e t ( true , c ons s e t ( false , emptyset ) ) in
51 ( ( ! processMS ( uecaps ) ) | ( ! processENB ) | ( ! processMME) |
52 ( ! processMSC ) | ( ! processRNC ))
Figure A.7: An excerpt of the LTE to UMTS handover
